THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO LAW REVIEW
Corporations-Transfer of Assets to Subsidiary-Relative Priority of Creditors[Federal].-A corporation had more assets than liabilities but not enough current
assets to meet obligations presently falling due. In order to obtain delay from the
claimant banks, it organized a subsidiary corporation, and transferred to it assets more
than sufficient to pay the debts owed to the claimants. The claimants surrendered
notes given by the larent, accepted those of the subsidiary and received substantial
payments on account. Further difficulties overcame the parent, and its creditors had
a receiver appointed. The creditors then sought an instruction to the receiver to take
the property of the subsidiary as assets of the parent. Both corporations had identical
officers, the parent owned all the stock in the subsidiary, and its president had, by
agreement, power to remove officers of the subsidiary without cause. It exercised complete control of the activities of the subsidiary. The claimant banks objected to the
instruction on the ground that the subsidiary was an entity distinct from the parent.
The lower court held that the parent and subsidiary were one, awarded the assets of
the subsidiary to the receiver of the parent and ordered the claimants to repay money
paid by the subsidiary on the assumed debts. On appeal, held, affirmed and modified.
The subsidiary was not a separate entity from the parent, but since there was no fraud,
and the parent was solvent at the time of the transfer to the subsidiary, the claimants
were entitled to keep money already paid to them and to priority in the assets of the
subsidiary. Commerce Trust Co. v. Woodbury, 77 F. (2d) 478 (C.C.A. 8th 1935).
Courts face the problem of deciding whether to recognize the separate entities of
parent and subsidiary corporations in three main groups of situations where rights of
creditors are affected: (i) Where it is sought to hold either corporation on torts, contracts, or other debts of the other. Berkey v. Third Ave. Ry., 244 N.Y. 84, 155 N.E. 58
(1926) (subsidiary held not liable for the torts of the parent); D. & P. Pub. Corp. v.
Conway, 252 Ill. App. 41 (1929) (subsidiary could not sue employee of parent upon his
contractual obligations to parent); Day v. PostalTelegraph Co., 66 Md. 354, 7 Atl. 6o8
(1887) (property of subsidiary devoted to pay the debts of the insolvent parent corporation). (2) Where one corporation seeks to prove a claim, as a creditor, in the bankruptcy of the other. It re Watertown Paper Co., 169 Fed. 252 (C.C.A. 2d igog) (claim
of subsidiary against bankrupt parent corporation allowed). (3) Where the assets of
one are sought in receivership proceedings against the other. In re Muncie Pulp Co.,
139 Fed. 546 (C.C.A. 2d 1905) (receiver of parent corporation allowed to take the
property of the subsidiary). No single principle, it seems, can explain the results of the
decided cases. Many circumstances, such as the amount of stock in the subsidiary
owned by the parent, the adequacy of the financing of the subsidiary, the control exerted by the parent, and the identity of officers, bear more or less heavily upon the determination, but no one factor is controlling. See CorsicanaBank v. Johnson, 251 U.S.
68 (1919); American Cyanamid Co. v. Wilson and Toomer Fertilizer Co., 5I F. (2d) 665
(C.C.A. 5th 1931); Owl Fumigating Corp. v. Cyanide Co., 24 F. (2d) 718 (D.C. Del.
1928); Gledhill v. Fisher and Co., 262 N.W. 371 (Mich. 1935). See also Douglas and
Shanks, Insulation from Liability through Subsidiary Corporations, 39 Yale LJ. 193
(1929). Some legal writers suggest that certainty should be sacrificed in favor of a
flexible rule capable of meeting the exigencies of each case as it arises. Powell, Parent
and Subsidiary Corporations § 7 (i931); Ballantine, Separate Entity of Parent and
Subsidiary Corporations, 14 Calif. L. Rev. 12 (1925). The courts evidently have been
employing a rule of this sort.

RECENT CASES
The decision in the principal case to disregard the separate entities would seem to
lead to the conclusion that creditors of the subsidiary were merely creditors of the
single corporation, and so were entitled to no priority. The transfer to the subsidiary,
however, was treated by the court as a transaction analogous to a mortgage or other
transfer to the claimants, a placing of assets where they would be free from the claims
of general creditors but available to satisfy the debts of the claimants. Since no fraudulent intent was found, the transaction could not ordinarily be attacked apart from
bankruptcy, even if the transferor had been insolvent. Bainberger v. Schoolfield, 16o
U.S. 149 (1895); Granuison v. Robertson, 231 Fed. 785 (C.C.A. 2d 1916); Davis v.
Hincke, 264 Ill. 46, 1o5 N.E. 708 (19)4). But an effective transfer requires that some
property interest be established in the creditor. Often a promise to transfer or an
incomplete pledge will give rise to an equitable lien which satisfies the rule. See Glenn,
Creditors' Rights and Remedies § 441 (1915). The creditor's property in specific assets has been held sufficient even though the debtor had control of them and power to
substitute others for those originally set aside. Sexton v. Kessler, 225 U.S. 90 (1912).
Cf. Casey v. Cavaroc, 96 U.S. 467 (1877). It seems clear then that the claimants had a
right to payments actually made to them by the subsidiary. But a transfer which
leaves the debtor with complete power to dispose of the property so that it remains
part of his general assets, will not be sustained against general creditors. National City
Bank v. Hotchkiss, 231 U.S. 50 (1913); Mechanics' and Metals Bank v. Ernst, 231 U.S.
6o (1913). Promises to pay out of a particular fund are unenforceable and therefore
come within this principle. Pollock v. Jones, 124 Fed. 163 (C.C.A. 4 th 19o3); Torrance
v. Winfield National Bank, 66 Kan. 177, 71 Pac. 235 (1903). In the instant case, disregarding the separate entities meant that the assets in dispute were the assets of a
single corporate debtor. Then the want of fraud was immaterial, for the transfer to the
subsidiary purported to create no property interest in the claimant banks, and there
was no reason for preferring them over general creditors of the parent. Permitting the
creditors to retain payments actually made was justified however, as executed preferences are valid in the absence of bankruptcy.

Corporations-Watered Stock-Right of Trustee in Bankruptcy to Collect Assessment on Shares-[Federal].-An Arizona corporation issued shares for a consideration
admittedly worth far less than the par value of the shares. The state constitution provided: "No corporation shall issue stock, except to bona fide subscribers therefore.
....
All fictitious increase of stock ....
shall be void." Ariz. Const. Art. 14, § 6.
The corporation later incurred indebtedness and was adjudicated bankrupt. On application of the trustee, the bankruptcy court ordered an assessment on the shares. On
appeal by the shareholder, held, decree reversed on the grounds (i) that the shares
were wholly void under the constitutional provision and could not be made the basis of
liability, and (2) that the decree could not be defended on a fraud theory since there
was proof that at least some of the creditors had not relied upon any representation
that the shares were fully paid. Hirshfeldv. McKinley, 78 F. (2d) 124 (C.C.A. 9th 1935).
It is usually recognized that constitutional or statutory provisions like that quoted
above were designed at least partly for the protection of creditors and that to achieve
this purpose they should be construed not to make the transaction entirely void. The
weight of authority permits recovery by creditors or a trustee in bankruptcy against

